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1Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of informal economic activity. We present two equilibrium
models of informality and test their implications using a survey of 48,000+ small ﬁrms in Brazil.
We deﬁne informality as tax avoidance; ﬁrms in the informal sector avoid tax payments but suﬀer
other limitations. In the ﬁrst model there is a single industry and informal ﬁrms face a higher cost
of capital and a limitation on size. As a result informal ﬁrms are smaller and have a lower capital-
labor ratio. When education is an imperfect proxy for ability, we show that the interaction of the
manager’s education and formality has a positive correlation with ﬁrm size. These implications are
supported by our empirical analysis. A novel theoretical contribution in this paper is a model that
highlights the role of value added taxes in transmitting informality. It predicts that the informality
of a ﬁrm is correlated to the informality of ﬁrms from which it buys or sells. The model also
implies that higher tolerance for informal ﬁrms in one production stage increases tax avoidance
in downstream and upstream sectors. Empirical analysis shows that, in fact, various measures of
formality of suppliers and purchasers (and its enforcement) are correlated with the formality of a
ﬁrm. Even more interestingly, when we look at sectors where Brazilian ﬁrms are not subject to
the credit system of value added tax, but instead the value added tax is applied at some stage of
production at a rate that is estimated by the State, this chain eﬀect vanishes.
JEL Codes: H2, H3, K4.
21 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the determinants of informality. It is diﬃcult to deﬁne
informal activities unambiguously, but estimates indicate that in 1990-1993 approxi-
mately 10% of GDP in the United States was produced by individuals or ﬁrms that
evaded taxes or engaged in illegal pursuits. It is also estimated that these activi-
ties produce 25 to 35% of aggregate output in Latin America, between 13 to 70% in
Asian countries, and around 15% in O.E.C.D. countries. (see Table 2 in Schneider
and Enste [20]).
Informality creates a ﬁscal problem, but there is also growing evidence that
informal ﬁrms are less eﬃcient,1 perhaps because of their necessarily small scale,
perhaps because of their lack of access to credit or access to the infrastructure of
legal protection provided by the State. In many less developed countries, creating
incentives for formalization is viewed as an important step to increase aggregate
productivity.
We present two related equilibrium models of the determinants of informality
and test their implications using a survey of 48,000+ small ﬁrms in Brazil. In both
models informality is deﬁned as tax avoidance. Firms in the informal sector avoid
paying taxes but suﬀer from other limitations.
The ﬁrst model can be seen as a variant of Rausch [17], who relied in the
modeling strategy of Lucas [14] in which managerial ability diﬀers across agents in
the economy, and assumed a limitation on the size of informal ﬁrms. We make a
modiﬁcation that generates additional testable implications. In addition to labor,
the ﬁrms in our model use capital and informal ﬁrms face a higher cost of funds.
This higher cost of capital for informal activities has been emphasized by DeSoto [5]
who observed that because the right to assets held by the poor are not typically well
documented “these assets cannot readily be turned into capital...[and] cannot be used
as collateral for a loan...”.2 This diﬀerence in interest rates induces a higher capital-
labor ratio in formal ﬁrms.3 As in Rausch [17], agents with lowest managerial ability
become workers and the ones with highest ability become formal managers, with
1Case studies reported in McKinsey [15] document that the ratio of labor productivity between
informal and formal ﬁrms is, on average, 39% in Turkey and 46% in Brazil.
2DeSoto [5], p.5-6. DeSoto [4] estimates that in June/85, informal ﬁrms in Lima (Peru) faced a
nominal interest rate of 22% per-month, while formal ﬁrms paid only 4.9% per month. We estimate
a much smaller, but still signiﬁcant, diﬀerence in capital costs between informal and formal ﬁrms in
our sample. Straub [21] develops a model in which a dual credit system arises in equilibrium.
3Informal ﬁrms may face lower labor costs, because their workers avoid some labor taxes. This
would induce even larger diﬀerences in capital-labor ratio.
3the intermediate group running informal ﬁrms. This is because managers with more
ability would naturally run larger ﬁrms and employ more capital; for this reason they
choose to join the formal sector, where they do not face limits on capital deployment
and face a lower cost of capital. The marginal ﬁrm trades oﬀ the cost of paying taxes
versus the higher cost of capital and the scale limitations of informal ﬁrms. As a
result, the marginal ﬁrm would employ in the informal sector less capital and labor
than it would employ if it joined the formal sector. Thus, as in Rausch [17] or Fortin
et al. [8], a size gap develops. Managers that are slightly more eﬃcient than the
manager of the marginal informal ﬁrm employ discretely larger amounts of capital
and labor.
In this class of models, entrepreneurs that operate in the informal sector are
too ineﬃcient to beneﬁt from the lower capital costs and scale economies aﬀorded to
formal entrepreneurs. In this sense these models agree with the results from a survey
of informal Mexican ﬁrms conducted by Mckenzie and Woodruﬀ that is reported in
Fajnzylber et al [7], where 75% of the respondents reported that they were too small
to make it worth their while to become formal.4
Several implications of this model are supported by our empirical analysis
on Brazilian data. Formalization is positively correlated with the size of ﬁrms and
measures of the quality of the entrepreneurial input. Even after controlling for our
measures of the quality of an entrepreneur, formalization is correlated with a ﬁrm’s
capital-labor ratio or investment per worker. In addition, after controlling for the
quality of the entrepreneur, formalization is correlated with higher proﬁts.
The model predicts a correlation between manager’s ability and the size of
ﬁrm. Since a manager’s ability predicts formality, formality should give no additional
information concerning size, once we condition on a manager’s ability. Since ability
is not observable, we study the implications of a model in which one can observe
a variable, say educational achievement, that is correlated with a manager’s ability.
We show that a regression of the size of the ﬁrm on this observed variable and the
interaction of the observed variable and formality should produce positive coeﬃcients.
This implication is supported by our empirical results.
The main focus of our theoretical analysis is a model that highlights the role
of value added taxes in transmitting informality. It exploits the idea that collecting
value added taxes according to a credit scheme sets in motion a mechanism for the
transmission of informality. The value added tax is a prevalent form of indirect taxa-
4...presumably relative to cost.
4tion: more than 120 nations had adopted it by 2000.5 In the credit or invoice method
that is often used, the value added tax applies to each sale and each establishment
receives a credit for the amount of tax paid in the previous stages of the production
chain. This credit is then used by the taxpayer against future liabilities with the
tax authorities. Since purchases from informal suppliers are ineligible for tax credits,
an incentive exists for the propagation of informality downstream in the production
chain. A similar mechanism also inﬂuences ﬁrms upstream in the chain: selling to in-
formal ﬁrms increases the likelihood for a ﬁrm to be informal.6 Our empirical analysis
shows that, in fact, various measures of formality of suppliers and purchasers (and
its enforcement) are correlated with the formality of a ﬁrm. These ﬁndings survive
when we use instrumental variables to control for possible simultaneity. Even more
interestingly, when we look at sectors where Brazilian ﬁrms are not subject to the
credit system of value added tax, but instead the value added tax is applied at some
early stage of production at a rate that is estimated by the State, this chain eﬀect
vanishes.
Since the mid 90’s, following the lead of the Federal government, several Brazil-
ian states introduced SIMPLES programs that simpliﬁed and lowered the VAT rates
for small ﬁrms. The state of S˜ ao Paulo, the largest and richest state in the Brazilian
Federation, introduced its SIMPLES in 1998. Rio Grande do Sul, another large and
relatively rich southern state, started its own program only in 2005. We use data on
these two states and two rounds of the Brazilian survey of small ﬁrms to evaluate
the impact of the introduction of these state programs. Our results point to a sig-
niﬁcantly positive impact of the program introduction, increasing the probability of
formalization by approximately one-third.
The models in this paper ignore possible alternative reasons for informality,
such as the ﬁxed cost of complying with regulations, labor taxes or the existence of
a minimum-wage. They also ignore beneﬁts that have been highlighted in the litera-
ture — such as access to participation in the legal system and other civil institutions.
Considering these omitted costs and beneﬁts should not change the qualitative im-
plications of our models.
Other papers that investigate causes and determinants of informality include
Loayza [13] and Friedman et al. [9] which provide evidence of an association between
the size of the underground economy and higher taxes, more labor market restrictions,
5See Appendix 4 in Schenk and Oldman [19].
6To our knowledge, the only study to investigate the informal sector in conjunction with a VAT
structure is Emran and Stiglitz [6]. Their focus is on the consequences of informality for a revenue
neutral tax reform involving value added and trade taxes.
5and poorer institutions (bureaucracy, corruption and legal environment). Junqueira
and Monteiro [11] and Fajnzylber et al. [7] are recent papers that use an earlier (1997)
wave of the the survey we employ in this paper. They both explore the institution of
the federal SIMPLES, which simpliﬁed and reduced rates for tax compliance for small
ﬁrms in Brazil, to make inferences on the relation of taxes and informality. Although
our empirical results speak to a somewhat diﬀerent set of questions (for instance, the
multi-stage transmission of informality captured by our second model), use data from
a diﬀerent year (2003 versus 1997) and refer to a diﬀerent deﬁnition for formalization,7
their empirical results are broadly in line with the implications of our models. Both
papers ﬁnd that the enactment of SIMPLES has increased formality through a smaller
tax burden and cheaper formalization costs. In particular, Fajnzylber and co-authors
ﬁnd that the formalization is associated with more labor and capital stocks as well
as higher productivity, which agrees with the predictions of our models. They fail
to obtain signiﬁcant eﬀects on formalization of participation in government assisted
programmes (about which our models are silent) and access to formal credit markets.8
In sum, the combination of the models we develop and the Brazilian microdata allows
us to add novel insights to this literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
develop a model of a single industry, while in Section 3 we treat the model with two
stages of production. Section 4 contains the empirical results obtained using data on
informal ﬁrms in Brazil and Section 5 concludes.
7Junqueira and Monteiro [11] and Fajnzylber et al. [7] use municipal licensing as proxy for
formalization instead tax registration, the measure we use. Junqueira and Monteiro recognize that
tax registration would be a more appropriate indication of formalization, but opt for licensing because
the question on tax registration was only asked for those who indicated that their ﬁrm had been
“legally constituted” — that is, a contract had been registered with the proper authorities. We do
not view this as a problem, since according to Brazilian law only legally constituted ﬁrms are eligible
for tax registration.
8In the preliminary version of Fajnzylber et al. [7] that we read, it is not clear how formal credit is
deﬁned, but we believe it refers to bank loans. In our empirical work we use a broader interpretation
of credit — 40% of those who claimed to have obtained loans (25% of the formal entrepreneurs
that claimed loans) did it from non-bank sources. In addition, Fajnzylber et al. [7] focuses on ﬁrms
created around the time of the introduction of the SIMPLES in 1996, just after the implementation
of the Real stabilization program, when Brazilian credit markets where much less developed than in
2002. The preliminary version also contains some omissions that prevent us to make more precise
comparisons (for instance, which exogenous covariates they use and whether they control for sector
of activity).
62 A Model with One Production Stage
We consider a continuum of agents; each characterized by a parameter θ ≥ 0 which
indicates his quality as an entrepreneur and is distributed according to a probability
density function g(·). An entrepreneur chooses between becoming a worker, operating
a ﬁrm in the formal sector or in the informal sector. We assume that the production
function in the two sectors is identical. If an entrepreneur employs l workers and k
units of capital, output equals y = θkαlβ, with α,β > 0 and α + β < 1.
A formal entrepreneur pays an ad valorem tax rate of τ and faces a capital
cost of rf > 0 per unit. An informal entrepreneur pays no taxes, but faces a capital
cost of ri ≥ rf. All workers are paid the same wage w.
An informal entrepreneur, if detected by the authorities, loses all his proﬁts.
The probability of being detected depends monotonically on the size of the ﬁrm.
Though there are several possibilities for measuring the size of the ﬁrm - output,
capital stock or labor force - we choose here to use the capital stock (which we
identify in the empirical work as the value of installations), because we imagine the
probability of detection as a function of the “visibility” of the ﬁrm. We write p(k) for
the probability of detection. While in the Appendix we discuss a more general form
for the function p we will assume here that:
p(k) = 0, if k ≤ k (1)
= 1, if k > k, (2)
that is an informal ﬁrm cannot employ more than k units of capital, but will not
suﬀer any penalty when k ≤ k.






α − wl − rik}, (3)





α − wl − rfk} (4)
The capital-labor ratios of formal ﬁrms or informal ﬁrms that are uncon-
strained are proportional to the relative prices between labor and capital and in-
dependent of the entrepreneur’s ability. Since ri ≥ rf, unconstrained informal ﬁrms
have a lower capital-labor ratio than formal ﬁrms. In addition, constrained informal
7ﬁrms have a lower capital-labor ratio than unconstrained informal ﬁrms. Hence the
capital-labor ratios of informal ﬁrms are lower than that of the formal ﬁrms, the
diﬀerence being bigger the larger is the diﬀerence in capital costs between informal
and formal ﬁrms (ri −rf). In Section 4 we provide evidence in favor of the predicted
diﬀerence in capital-labor ratios between formal and informal ﬁrms.
The usual properties of proﬁt functions guarantee that both Πi and Πf are
convex functions of θ,w and the respective cost of capital, ri and rf. In addition the
capital and labor choices of each type of entrepreneur are monotone. Using the ﬁrst




















If 1 − τ ≥ (
rf
ri )α, taxes are too low with respect to the capital cost wedge and every
entrepreneur prefers to be formal. Since we are interested in the informal sector we
assume from now on that 1 − τ < (
rf
ri )α. In this case, every entrepreneur θ for which
the optimal choice in the informal sector is unconstrained will prefer to be informal.
Let θ be the lowest value of θ for which an informal entrepreneur would choose a
capital stock ¯ k. For θ > θ the informal entrepreneur would keep k = ¯ k and, as a





for some constant c. Comparison of this last expression with equation (5) above shows
that there exists a unique θ such that Πi(θ) < Πf(θ) if and only if θ > θ.
Each agent also has the choice of becoming a worker and receive the market
wage w. Hence the occupational choice cutoﬀ points are implicitly deﬁned by:
Πf(θ) = Πi(θ) (8)
max{Πi(ˆ θ),Πf(ˆ θ)} = w (9)
and optimal choices are:
θ ≤ ˆ θ =⇒ Worker;
θ ∈ (ˆ θ,θ] =⇒ Informal entrepreneur;
θ > max{θ, ˆ θ} =⇒ Formal entrepreneur.
8Since Πi(0) = 0 and Πf(0) = 0, ˆ θ > 0, whenever w > 0. However, if θ < ˆ θ
then no entrepreneur would choose informality. In any case, equilibrium in the labor















where the arguments remind the reader of the dependence of the cutoﬀs and labor
demand on the level of wages.
The existence of an equilibrium level of wages is straightforward. Also if k is
small enough then θ < ˆ θ. Furthermore if θ is suﬃciently large, an entrepreneur of
quality θ would choose the formal sector and thus ˆ θ is ﬁnite. Formal ﬁrms always
exist, provided the support of g is large enough.
Another implication of this model is the existence of a discontinuity in the level
of capital and labor employed at levels of productivity around θ. This discontinuity
follows since an entrepreneur with ability just below θ chooses the informal sector and
employs exactly k units of capital, although the marginal product of capital exceeds
his cost of capital. At a level just above θ, an entrepreneur chooses the formal sector
and since he is now unconstrained, he would choose a level k >> k. Furthermore,
since we assumed that ri(1 − τ)
1
α ≤ rf and Πi(θ) = Πf(θ) we know that
Πi(θ) ≤ θlf(θ)
βkf(θ)
α(1 − τ) − wlf(θ) − rikf(θ)(1 − τ)
1/α.
Hence kf(θ)α(1 − τ) > k
α












The left (right) hand side of equation (10) is exactly the labor demand by a formal
(informal) entrepreneur with quality θ. Hence labor demand also jumps up in the
transition to formality. Thus our model predicts a “gap” in the capital and labor
employed by ﬁrms near the the formalization threshold θ.
The empirical analysis of this gap is complicated because we do not observe
an entrepreneur’s ability θ and the data set we use has no information on interest
rates paid. In order to account for these limitations we assume that entrepreneurial
ability θ = xexp() where  is an unobserved determinant of entrepreneurial skill,
independent of x and with zero expected value and x is some observed variable (or
index of) that also inﬂuences entrepreneurship. In our empirical application we take
9measures of education as proxies for x.9 In this case, one can use the expressions for
optimal input level choices to obtain the expectation of the logarithm of employment
l conditional on the logx and conditional on being in the formal or informal sector.
Taking logs on the optimality conditions for labor demand and replacing θ



























We highlight the fact that managerial ability inﬂuences the demand for labor
in three ways. A direct eﬀect exists since more productive entrepreneurs will demand
more labor as this factor’s marginal product is higher under better management. An
indirect eﬀect occurs because a better manager will also install more capital, driv-
ing up labor’s marginal productivity and hence the demand for labor. However this
indirect eﬀect will not be present for the more skilled informal managers since they
will be constrained. A third eﬀect, which we call Formalization Eﬀect and is local
to θ, occurs as entrepreneurs become formal and start paying taxes. This exerts a
negative eﬀect on the demand for labor which is nonetheless outweighed by the other
two eﬀects as pointed out previously.
If one estimates a linear regression of lnl on lnx and an interaction between
lnx and formalization (θ ≥ θ) as we do in our empirical section for a sample of en-
trepreneurs, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term delivers the incremental sensitivity
of lnl to lnx due to formalization. This is the sample counterpart of the best linear




 ≥ ˆ θ] = ξ0 + ξ1 lnx + ξ21xe≥θ.lnx
where the conditioning event xe ≥ ˆ θ reﬂects the fact that we use only entrepreneurs.
As one would expect formal entrepreneurs to employ more labor, the last term should
be positive. Intuitively, in order for that to be the case, were there enough ﬂexibility
we would like to make ξ2 positive whenever lnx is positive and negative whenever
9Lazear [12] characterizes entrepreneurs as “jacks-of-all-trades who need not excel in any one skill
but are competent in many”. In this sense, managerial or entrepreneurial ability is determined in
large part by balanced human capital investment. Even though better proxies may be envisioned (see
for example the empirical application in that article), we take education as a reasonable determinant
for the quality of an entrepreneur.
10lnx is negative. This is not possible, since ξ2 is ﬁxed. Its sign will depend on the
relatively distribution of lnx between negative and positive values. The following
result can nonetheless be stated and relies on this intuition.
Proposition 1 Let x be a random variable with ﬁnite support. If supp(lnx) ⊂ R+
with at least one non-zero element then ξ2 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is used in Section 4 to document evidence in favor of our model.
3 A Model with Two Production Stages
In this section we introduce a model with two stages of production. Our goal is to
illustrate the transmission of informality across sectors which results from the use of
the value added tax. In Section 4 we document that this mechanism is relevant for
the generation of informality in Brazil.
There are two stages of production: “upstream” and “downstream”. All in-
dividuals in this model are entrepreneurs and, for simplicity, we assume that they
are specialized in one of the stages. Each entrepreneur in the upstream sector is
characterized by his ability θu > 0. The density of θu is gu(·). An entrepreneur of
ability θu can produce θu units of the intermediate good in the formal sector, but
only min(y,θu), where y > 0, if in the informal sector.
The downstream entrepreneurs are characterized by an ability parameter θd
with density gd(·). An agent with ability θd, if in the formal sector, produces θdxα
units of the formal good using x units of the intermediate good. However if in the
informal sector he faces a limit on the quantity of input that can be used and the
production function becomes θd min(x,x)α, where x > 0.
We assume that gu and gd are continuous and that there exists θu < y for
which gu(θu) > 0, and that gd(θd) > 0 for θd > 0.
The ﬁnal good is tradeable and has an exogenous price q. Firms in the formal
sector pay an ad-valorem tax rate of τ and we write π = 1−τ. The value added tax is
levied by the credit method: the tax rate applies to each sale and each establishment
receives a credit for the amount of tax paid in the previous stages of production.
Because of the tax credit, the prices paid for informal and formal goods may be
distinct and we let pf be the price of the intermediate good in the formal sector and




f(θu) = πpfθu (11)
Π
u
i (θu) = pi min{θu,y} (12)
for the proﬁt of an upstream ﬁrm with manager of quality θu if it produces in the
formal (informal) sector. Downstream ﬁrms face a slightly more complicated problem,








α − pix]}, (13)
for the proﬁt of a downstream ﬁrm with a manager with ability θd that chooses to







α − pix]}, (14)
for the proﬁt of a downstream ﬁrm with a manager of ability θd that chooses to
operate in the informal sector.


















while if he buys from the informal sector he demands xf(θd,
p
π,q), since the tax credit
does not apply.
As in the model with one stage, the demand for the intermediate input, as the
following proposition shows, will exhibit a large enough “discontinuity”.
Proposition 2 If Πd
f(θd) > Πd
i(θd) then the optimal choice of the ﬁrm with manager
of quality θd, xf(θd,p,q), where p = pf if the ﬁrm’s optimal choice is to buy the formal
good and p =
pi




> x ≥ xi(θd,p,q),
for any θ.
12Proof : Suppose ﬁrst that it is optimal for the ﬁrm with manager of quality θd to buy
the formal good. If πxf(θd,pf,q) < x, since
qθd(πxf(θd,pf,q))
α − πpfxf(θd,pf,q) ≥ π(qθdx
α
f(θd,pf,q) − πpfxf(θd,pf,q)),
the ﬁrm would prefer to be in the informal sector and buy πxf(θd,pf,q) of formal
inputs. If the ﬁrm bought the informal good and πxf(θd,
pi

















the ﬁrm would prefer to be in the informal sector and buy πxf(θd,
pi
π ,q) of informal
inputs. 
We now derive aggregate demand and supply of the intermediate good in the
formal and informal sectors as a function of prevailing prices. Since we are interested
in equilibrium prices we may restrict the range of prices to 0 < πpf ≤ pi ≤ pf. In
fact, if πpf > pi proﬁt maximization and equations (13) and (14) imply that both
formal and informal entrepreneurs downstream would buy from informal upstream
ﬁrms. However, every upstream entrepreneur will prefer to produce in the formal
sector. Similarly, if pi > pf every downstream entrepreneur would prefer to buy from
formal ﬁrms. However, small θu agents would prefer to produce informally. Further-
more when πpf ≤ pi ≤ pf downstream informal (formal) entrepreneurs weakly prefer
to buy from informal (formal) producers. If these inequalities are strict, preferences
are also strict. In addition, the homogeneity of the system allows us to choose q = 1
(and hence we omit q as a function argument in what follows).
The following proposition shows the existence of cutoﬀ points for each stage,
θu(pi,pf) and θd(pi,pf) such that all managers with ability below the cutoﬀ (weakly)
prefer informality and all those with ability above the cut-oﬀ points prefer to join the
formal sector.
Proposition 3 If θu < θu(pi,pf) =
piy
πpf ≥ y then Πu
i (θu) ≥ Πu




i (θu) < Πu
f(θu).
(ii) There exists a θd(pi,pf) such that if θd < θd(pi,pf) then Πd
i(θd) ≥ Πd
f(θd) and if
θd > θd(pi,pf) then Πd
i(θd) < Πd
f(θd).
Proof : (i) is immediate from equations (11) and (12). To show that (ii) holds note
that θd enters the deﬁnition of the proﬁt function of formal ﬁrms exactly as an output
13price and hence, from the properties of proﬁt functions with respect to output prices,
we know that its derivative with respect to θd is proportional to xf(θd,p) which goes
to inﬁnity as θd → ∞. Furthermore, the function Πd
i(θd) is convex and, since supply
functions of ﬁrms must slope up, if the choice, conditional on informality, of a ﬁrm
of ability θ satisﬁes xi(θ) = x then the optimal choice conditional on informality,
xi(θd) = x for θd ≥ θ, and as a consequence, Πd
i(θd) is linear for θd ≥ θ. In addition,




i = ϕ(pi) > ϕ(pf)










f(θd), provided θd > 0. 
Similarly to the model with one stage, the size of ﬁrms will be discontinu-
ous with respect to the quality of the entrepreneur.
Proposition 4 (i) If pf > πpi the output of the smallest upstream formal ﬁrm
pfy
πpi > y.
(ii) πxf(θd(pi,pf)) ≥ x and, in particular, the output of the smallest downstream
formal ﬁrm is strictly bigger than the output of the largest informal ﬁrm.
Proof : (i) is obvious. Furthermore, the entrepreneur θd(pi,pf) must be indiﬀerent
between being formal or informal. Since informal (formal) entrepreneurs weakly prefer
to buy from informal (formal) suppliers, we must have:
θd(pi,pf)x












must satisfy F 0(θd(pi,pf)) ≤





Since 0 < π < 1 and 0 < α < 1, x ≤ πxf(θd(pi,pf)). 
Because of the possibility of indiﬀerence, we have supply and demand cor-
respondences as opposed to functions. We will write S(pi,pf) for the set of possible
14aggregate supply vectors (si(pi,pf),sf(pi,pf)) obtained from the choices of proﬁt max-
imizing entrepreneurs in the upstream stage. If pi 6= πpf the set S(pi,pf) contains a











If πpf = pi = 0 then S(pi,pf) = {0}. Finally when πpf = pi 6= 0 a point (si,sf) ∈









Since we ﬁxed q = 1 we write X(pi,pf) for the set of possible aggregate demand vec-
tors (xi(pi,pf),xf(pi,pf)) obtained from the choices of proﬁt maximizing entrepreneurs
in the downstream stage.
When πpf = pi formal ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between buying the formal or
informal input, but informal ﬁrms prefer buying from informal ﬁrms. Hence we
can allocate all formal ﬁrms with managers below a certain threshold to buying in
the informal sector with the complement interval assigned to purchase in the formal
















If πpf < pi < pf formal (informal) ﬁrms prefer to buy from formal (informal)
10In principle we could assign any subset of entrepreneurs with productivity below y to the informal
sector, but there is always an interval containing the origin that would produce exactly the same
aggregate output.
11As before, these assignments can reproduce the demands realized by any arbitrary assignment
of ﬁrms to each sector.









If pf = pi informal ﬁrms are indiﬀerent, but formal ﬁrms prefer buying from
formal ﬁrms. Hence we may assign informal ﬁrms arbitrarily to buying formal or in-













An equilibrium is a vector (pi,pf,1) such that ∃z ∈ X(pi,pf)
T
S(pi,pf).
We will decompose the proof of the existence of an equilibrium price in two
steps. First we will set pi = µpf with π ≤ µ ≤ 1. For each µ we will show that there
exists a unique pi(µ) such that if (pi,pf) = (pi(µ),
pi(µ)
µ ) then the sum of aggregate
supply of the formal and informal intermediate goods equals the sum of aggregate
demands. We then show that there exits a unique µ∗ such that (pi(µ∗),
pi(µ∗)
µ∗ ,1) is an
equilibrium. We will use the following preliminary result:
Lemma 1 If πpf < pi < pf then θd(pi,pf) decreases with pi and it increases with pf.
Further, if π ≤ µ ≤ 1 then, θd(pi,
pi
µ) increases with pi.











This establishes the ﬁrst part of the lemma, since increasing pi reduces proﬁts for
informal ﬁrms and increasing pf reduces proﬁts for formal ﬁrms.
In order to sign the change in θd(pi,
pi











for the marginal ﬁrm. If this is negative, the diﬀerence in proﬁts in the formal and
informal sectors for the marginal ﬁrm decreases and more ﬁrms will become informal.
















) + xi(θd,pi). (32)







) + xi(θd,pi) ≤ −
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µ
+ x ≤ 0







∂pi ) is not well deﬁned when pi = πpf (resp. pi = pf), but
it is easy to see that, in this case, the change in proﬁt diﬀerence between formality
and informality for the marginal ﬁrm still equals −π
µxf(θd,
pi
µ) + xi(θd,pi). 
We now return to the equilibrium analysis. For µ = π (pi = πpf) the sum of


















It is easy to check that this last expression goes to zero as pi → ∞ and to ∞ as pi → 0.
Furthermore, since demand of any type decreases with the price of the input, and,
from Proposition 2 xf(θd,pi/π) > xi(θd,pi), using the Lemma above it is immediate
that aggregate demand is monotonically decreasing with pi. Hence there exists a
unique pi(π) for which the sum of supplies equal the sum of demands.























Just as before, the result in the Lemma insures the monotonicity properties that yield
the existence of a unique pi(µ) that equates the sum of aggregate demands with that
of aggregate supplies.
Notice that an increase in µ always decreases aggregate supply since it causes
some ﬁrms in the upstream sector to switch from formal to informal. In addition,
an increase in µ increases the demand by formal ﬁrms at each pi and causes some
ﬁrms to switch from informal to formal in the downstream sector. Thus, at each pi,
aggregate demand goes up. Hence pi(µ) increases with µ.
The supply of the informal sector when pi = πpf is some amount in the inter-
val [0,
R y








If these intervals overlap, at pi = pi(π)/π then (pi(π),pi(π)/π) is an equilibrium. This
will happen whenever the tolerance for informality in the upstream sector (y) is high
enough.
If these intervals do not overlap, notice that the informal supply of the interme-
diate good must necessarily go up with µ. On the other hand, the informal demand at
(pi(µ),
pi(µ)
µ ) will go down since pi(µ) goes up and the relative price of the formal good




the demand is any number in the interval [0,
R θd(pi,pf)
0 xi(θd,pf)gd(θ)dθ]. Hence there
always exists a unique µ∗ such that (pi(µ∗),pi(µ∗)/µ∗,1) is an equilibrium.
3.1 Comparative statics
Simulations of the model show that an increase in tolerance in the upstream sector
increases the proportion of informal ﬁrms upstream and downstream. Figure 1 shows
that as y increases, the proportion of upstream ﬁrms that are informal increases.
As a result the price of the informal intermediate good pi decreases and some of
the downstream formal ﬁrms opt for informality. The fall in demand for the formal
intermediate good causes a fall in its price pf. A symmetric picture arises when we
change the tolerance for informality in the downstream sector, x.
[Figure 1 here]
184 Empirical Application
In this section we explore the implications of the theoretical framework laid out in the
previous section using a dataset on the informal sector in Brazil. Tax noncompliance
is an important phenomenon in this country. Schneider and Enste [20] estimate that
informality represents more than one-quarter of the Brazilian economy. Its value
added tax system was established in the sixties and VAT represents approximately
10% of tax collection.
4.1 Data
Our principal data source is the ECINF survey (Pesquisa de Economia Informal
Urbana) on informal ﬁrms realized by the Brazilian Statistics Bureau (IBGE). We
use the 2003 edition of that survey, collected in October 2003, from which we obtain
information on 48,701 entrepreneurs in urban regions from all states in the Brazilian
federation.12 We also use the 1997 edition for the analysis present in subsection 4.9.
The focus is on units with ﬁve or less employees and the sampling strategy uses the
demographic census as a frame. Before the survey, preliminary interviews screened
households for the presence of at least one entrepreneur with a business employing
ﬁve or less people. Households without such an entrepreneur were not included in the
frame for the survey. The sampling was designed in two stages: in each state (of a
total of 27) the primary sampling units (urban sectors) are stratiﬁed geographically
in three strata (capital, other urban sectors in the capital metropolitan area and
remaining urban sectors). In a second step, the primary sampling units were stratiﬁed
according to levels of income within the geographical stratum. Urban sectors were
then randomly selected with probability proportional to the number of households
in the sector. From each selected urban sector a total of 16 households was then
randomly selected for interviews.13. Since the focus of the survey and the deﬁnition
of informal economic unit adopted by the Brazilian statistics bureau were those ﬁrms
with less than ﬁve employees and not those in irregular situation, we do believe
answers were truthful even when individuals were inquired about their status with the
Brazilian tax authorities. Interviewees were made aware that information collected
12When an entrepreneur owns two ﬁrms, this corresponds to two observations in our sample. When
a ﬁrm has two partners that live in the same household, this also corresponds to two observations.
Initially we have 48,803 observations which are reduced to 48,701 observations after discarding data
points corresponding to entrepreneurs younger than 15 yrs.-old.
13For more information on the sampling strategies employed, see Almeida and Bianchini [1].
19for the survey was conﬁdential and would only be utilized for statistical purposes.14
The ideal dataset for testing our second model would comprise information on
the production chain associated to each ﬁrm. Although the ECINF contains certain
characteristics of a ﬁrm’s clientele (whether they were predominantly large or small
companies, persons or governmental institutions), this information is very limited.
To complement these data we used the input-output matrix information available
from the Brazilian Statistics Bureau (IBGE). We computed inter-sectoral technical
input coeﬃcients and measures of output sectoral destination using the 2003 Brazilian
national accounts.15
4.2 Description of Variables
We eliminated ﬁrms with owners who were less than 15 years old and the observations
lacking education or gender information, what restricted our sample to around 48,000
observations.
Table 1 summarizes the main variables used in the study. The ﬁrst is indicative
of formalization. It is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm is registered with
the Brazilian tax authorities.16 For ﬁrms in economic sectors that qualify for forward
tax substitution (see subsection 4.10 for an explanation), taxsub takes the value one.
The next two variables are dummies for ﬁrms that sell their products mainly to large
ﬁrms (largecl) or small ﬁrms (smallcl) (where large and small ﬁrms are those with
more and less than ﬁve employees, respectively). Govcl is a dummy for a ﬁrm that
sells mainly to governmental institutions. Other alternatives are persons or ignored.
Outsidehouse is a dummy that equals one when the activity is performed outside the
home. The number of employees (n worker) includes the owner. Even though the
survey focuses on ﬁrms with ﬁve or less employees, a few units (less than 0.1%) employ
14A disclaimer appears on top of the questionnaire stating that such information is conﬁdential
and protected by Law 5534 14/11/68.
15Tables 1 and 2 under “Tabelas de Recursos e Usos” available under National Accounts on
http://www.ibge.gov.br for 2003. The information is at current 2003 prices (rather than the al-
ternative: previous year monetary units). The construction of technical coeﬃcients follows the
European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA) speciﬁcations (see ten Raa [23]).
16The tax registry is the Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jur´ ıdicas, which replaced the previous
system, the Cadastro Geral de Contribuintes (CGC), used in the 1997 survey. This variable is the
most representative of formalization for our purposes, but we have nonetheless experimented with
using “legally constituted ﬁrms” and obtained virtually identical results. This is not surprising,
since, as we mentioned, the latter is a prerequisite tax registration and correlation between the two
measures of informality is 0.98.
20more than ﬁve people due to the lag between the screening and interviewing stages of
the survey and the fact that ﬁrms may have multiple partners which are also counted
as employees. The variables revenue, otherjob and bankloan are self-explanatory.
Education is a categorical variable with values depicted on Table 2. Age of the owner
is in years and gender equals 1 for male. The variable ho num is a measure of
wealth and is zero for non-homeowners and otherwise displays the number of rooms
in the house. The variables loginv and loginst measure the logarithm of investments
and capital installations in October/2003 (R$ 1,000).17 Proﬁt equals revenue minus
expenses in October/2003 (also in R$ 1,000). Logwage denotes the logarithm of the
total expenditures in salaries (in R$1,000) divided by the number of employees in the
ﬁrm.18 The variables (clform and supform measure formalization among customers
and suppliers of a ﬁrm (see subsection 4.7 for the construction of these variables).
[Tables 1 and 2 here]
Each ﬁrm in the sample is classiﬁed into economic activities following the
CNAE (Classiﬁca¸ c˜ ao Nacional de Atividades Econˆ omicas) classiﬁcation.19 Using
technical coeﬃcients as well as sectoral output allocation coeﬃcients from the Na-
tional Accounts System (NAS) (using NAS sector classiﬁcation) we are then able to
assign to each activity in the survey a vector with those coeﬃcients. Since the sur-
vey and National Accounts use diﬀerent classiﬁcation schemes we had to match the
activities in both systems. Typically a CNAE activity corresponds to a single NAS
sector, but there are a few exceptions. Whenever such a multiple match occurred,
we assigned to a CNAE sector the weighted averages (using NAS sector production
value) of the coeﬃcients in the corresponding NAS sectors. The ECINF survey also
has its own aggregate sectoral characterization, displayed on Table 4.
We use these coeﬃcients as a vector measure of sectoral allocation of output
and sectoral input assignment by a ﬁrm. The last two variables on Table 1 are mea-
sures of formalization enforcement for suppliers and customers20 and were constructed
as follows. We used information available from the Brazilian Ministry of Labor on the
number of ﬁrms visited in a given economic sector and state during 2002 to monitor
17The value of installations refers to owned installations. Rented equipment is not included. Only
7% of formal ﬁrms and 7% of informal ﬁrms reported any rented equipment
18As a reference, the annual GDP per capita in Brazil for 2003 was R$ 8,694.47 according to IBGE
(log(8.69447/12) = log(0.72454) = −0.13).
19The Brazilian Bureau of Statistics website (http://www.ibge.gov.br) provides a description of
this classiﬁcation as well as various matching tables to other classiﬁcation schemes.
20The enforcement information was also used by Almeida and Carneiro [2].
21labor regulation compliance. We normalized the number of visits in each state and
sector by the number of persons employed in that state and sector provided by the
Brazilian Statistics Bureau (IBGE) (through the Cadastro Central de Empresas).21
Assuming that a ﬁrm’s suppliers were in the same state, we generated an index of
supplier formalization enforcement as a weighted average of these variables where the
weights were the sectoral input demand coeﬃcients. We used sectoral output alloca-
tion coeﬃcients to obtain an analogous measure of client formalization enforcement.
The correlation matrix for our variables is on Table 3.
[Tables 3 and 4 here]
4.3 Probability of Formalization
Table 5 contains probit estimates for the formalization variable taxreg using two
diﬀerent sets of controls. The signs obtained for each one of the regressors are as
expected. The coeﬃcient of the variable “working outside the home” is positive. In
agreement with the ﬁrst model, the coeﬃcients are also positive for variables related
to the size of the ﬁrm (number of employees and revenue), credit (bankloan), or the
quality of the entrepreneurial input (education, age or having no additional job).
Since women in Brazil are more likely to have substantial household duties, the sign
on the gender variable is probably related to entrepreneurial input. The coeﬃcients
on all these variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
[Table 5 here]
The two sets of estimates use diﬀerent sectoral controls. In the ﬁrst set we
used dummies for state and sector (according to the speciﬁcation on Table 4). In
the second set of results we used the derived output coeﬃcients obtained from the
Brazilian National Accounts (and equivalent results are obtained if one uses the input
coeﬃcients). The National Accounts System in Brazil categorizes economic activity
into forty-two sectors. The “use table” in the NAS allows one to obtain how much in a
given year a sector required in terms of input from another sector in the economy. This
can be used to obtain the technical coeﬃcients for each NAS sector (see footnote 15).
We were able to identify the sector (according to the NAS) for each ﬁrm in the
ECINF survey using equivalence tables among the diﬀerent classiﬁcation schemes that
are available from the Brazilian Statistics Bureau. The “make table” in the National
21Similar calculations were also performed using as normalizing variable the number of ﬁrms in
the state-sector (also obtained through the Cadastro Central de Empresas).
22Accounts provides the quantity of output destined to each sector of the economy (plus
ﬁnal demand, which comprises inventory, family consumption, exports and public
administration). We used this information to assemble a vector of sectoral allocation
for each monetary unit of output generated for each activity in our sample (and hence
each observation in our sample): (oaj)j=1,...,42. These controls, in additional to state
dummies, are used in the second set of estimates presented in the table.22
4.4 Investment, Installations per Worker and Proﬁts
Since an entrepreneur’s true ability is not observable, it makes sense to measure the
eﬀect of formalization after controlling for characteristics of the manager and the ﬁrm.
The model predicts that informal ﬁrms would choose a lower capital-labor ratio, and
Table 6 depicts the eﬀect of formalization on investments and installations per worker.
The coeﬃcient has the right sign and is statistically signiﬁcant. Formalization has an
economic signiﬁcance of 0.31 for investments per worker and 0.52 for installations per
worker regardless of the measure of formalization23. In other words, formalization is
associated with an increase in investments (installations) per worker of 0.31 (0.52)
standard deviations.
[Table 6 here]
We also examined the correlation of formalization with proﬁts. The results
are summarized in the same table. Again, after controlling for characteristics of the
manager and the ﬁrm, formalization has a statistically signiﬁcantly positive associa-
tion with proﬁts. Formalization is associated with an increase in monthly proﬁts of
approximately 700 Reais.24
4.5 Regression Regimes
In our regressions we used education as one of the measures of an entrepreneur’s
quality θ. Our model predicts a “gap” in the size distribution of ﬁrms as a function of
the quality of the entrepreneur. Our observable measure for entrepreneurial quality
input, education, is an integer between 1 and 8. Hence lnx ≥ 0 and Proposition 1
22For each observation we can also assemble a vector of input requirements (tcj)j=1,...,42 and these
controls result in estimates similar to the ones presented using output coeﬃcients.
23For dummy variables, we deﬁne the economic signiﬁcance as the regression coeﬃcient divided
by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
24This ﬁgure is for October 2003, when 1 US dollar was worth 2.87 Reais.
23guarantees that the interaction coeﬃcient is positive (provided the model is a valid
description).
Table 7 exhibits OLS estimates of the number of employees on a series of
controls and using education of the owner as the observable productivity enhancing
feature. The coeﬃcient of the interaction of education and formality is positive and
signiﬁcant. The result persists when we control for the level of wages within the ﬁrm.
Since the number of employees is an integer, we also ran an ordered probit and a
Poisson25 regression, but the results are very similar.
[Table 7 here]
4.6 Cost of Capital
In the ﬁrst model, the marginal product of capital of formal entrepreneurs is:












These quantities should then equal the cost of capital: ˜ rf = δ + rf for formal
and ˜ ri = δ+ri for unconstrained informal entrepreneurs, where δ is the common rate




˜ rf, and hence an estimate of
˜ ri
˜ rf is a lower bound for
ri
rf. With the maintained assumption that α is the same for both formal and informal
entrepreneurs, an estimator for
˜ ri
˜ rf would be:
yi/ki (for unconstrained informal ﬁrm)
(1 − τ)yf/kf (for formal ﬁrm)
.
In practice, neither output nor capital are perfectly measured in the survey
we use. Taking revenue (net of taxes) and the value of installations as imperfect






25A Poisson regression models the dependence of a countable random variable Y on covariates X.
It postulates a Poisson distribution for Y with expectation exp(α + β0X).
26Installations for example include facilities, tools, machines, furniture and vehicles, which may
themselves be reported with error, and exclude working capital and inventories.
24where y and k stand for the measurement errors in output and capital, which we
assume are on average zero and uncorrelated with output and capital. Under these
assumptions, the average revenue and installation values converge in large samples to
the expected output and capital in the population. Conventional application of the































where σ2 denote variances and σrevenue,installations the covariance between revenues and
installations. Σ can be estimated consistently by its sample analog which we write
as b Σ. We append the subscript i or f to N, Σ and r when referring to unconstrained
informal or formal entrepreneurs respectively. The estimator relies on the assumption
that the measurement error is averaged out across many randomly sampled individual
and is reminiscent of the strategy used by Milton Friedman in his classical study of
consumption.27
Assume now that one samples independently Nf formal entrepreneurs and Ni
unconstrained informal entrepreneurs and that Ni/Nf converges to a positive value c
as the sample size grows. An additional application of the usual asymptotic arguments
shows that the distribution of the ratio of revenue per installation for unconstrained






avg installationsfor unconstrained informal ﬁrms
avg revenue (net of taxes)















which again can be consistently estimated using the sample analogs for its components
(for c use actual Ni/Nf).
Among the informal ﬁrms, the unconstrained entrepreneurs are those with
27Friedman showed that cross-section regressions would underestimate the propensity to consume
since observed consumption and income are imperfect measurements of their permanent counterpart
and suggested the ratio of the average consumption and average income as a better estimator for
the propensity to consume.
25lower skill parameter θ. Since more able entrepreneurs will employ more capital and
more labor, we can use the number of workers as a sorting mechanism and focus on the
group of entrepreneurs employing lower amounts of labor. Using informal employers
with two or less workers leads to a point estimate of
˜ ri
˜ rf of 1.31 with a standard error
of 0.0178. Using informal employers with only one worker yield similar estimates.
Hence we estimate that, in our data set, informal ﬁrms face a rate of interest that is
at least 1.3 times the interest rate faced by formal ﬁrms.
4.7 Chain Eﬀects on Formalization
One initial approach to investigate the existence of cross-industry eﬀects of formal-
ization is to employ a characterization of a ﬁrm’s clientele as presented in the ECINF
survey. Interviewees were asked to declare whether sales were principally to govern-
mental institutions, large ﬁrms (more than ﬁve employees), small ﬁrms (ﬁve employees
or less) or persons. Sales to governmental institutions, large ﬁrms and small ﬁrms tend
to increase the probability of formalization with the largest eﬀect being associated
with governmental organizations and the lowest with small enterprises as depicted on
Table 8. Since one can intuitively order these three categories according to formal-
ization (with government being the most formal and large ﬁrms being more formal
than small ones), we read these correlations as suggestive that there is a chain eﬀect
on formalization.
We also used a composite measure of formalization among a ﬁrm’s suppli-
ers to examine the chain eﬀect. This measure consists of a weighted average of the
formalization variable (taxreg) across supplying sectors using as weights the techni-
cal coeﬃcients for input utilization from each sector. More precisely, the formality
measure for the suppliers of ﬁrm i is given by
supplierformali =
P
j tcij × formalityj P
j tcij
(37)
where formalityj is the percentage of ﬁrms in sector j that display tax registration28
and tcij is the required amount of input from sector j per monetary unit of output pro-
duced by ﬁrm i (obtained from the technical coeﬃcients for that ﬁrm’s sector). This
measure of supplier’s formality only accounts for potential suppliers that are present
28Four NAS sectors were excluded since they are not sampled in the ECINF survey: agriculture,
mineral extraction, the sugar industry and other food products.
26in the survey and, in particular, ignores all suppliers that are large ﬁrms. Neverthe-
less, the results of our analysis again favor the model: the coeﬃcients attached to this
variable are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The estimation results are displayed
on Table 8. The marginal impact of supplier formalization on the probability of being
formal is 0.365.
A similar strategy was adopted for the sales of each ﬁrm, where a sectors’
formalization is now weighted according to the output break up by sector obtainable
as well from the NAS:
clientformali =
P
j oaij × formalityj P
j oaij
(38)
The results are depicted on Table 8. The coeﬃcient on this composite measure of
client formalization is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, with a marginal impact of
0.623.
[Table 8 here]
While the degree of tax compliance among a ﬁrm’s suppliers and customers
seems to aﬀect formalization, an endogeneity problem may arise since suppliers and
customers of a ﬁrm respond to the degree of tax compliance of that ﬁrm. This
would tend to bias the estimator upwards. Nevertheless, since the variable we use as
a proxy for formalization among clients is an imperfect measure of tax compliance
an extra source of endogeneity arises due to measurement error. In this case, with
mismeasured categorical variables, one cannot rule out the possibility of attenuation
bias in the opposite direction of the simultaneity bias (see Bound et al. [3]). To
address this potential endogeneity problem we ran instrumental variable versions for
the estimation results displayed in Table 8 using the average education level in the
entrepreneurs urban sector as an instrument for the formalization of a ﬁrms clients.
Since we use a single instrumental variable (and hence can only handle one endogenous
variable), we consolidate the dummy variables indicating large ﬁrms, small ﬁrms and
governmental institutions as a single variable. Table 9 display the results for the ﬁrst
set of estimates in Table 8 using the aggregate variable in place of largecl, smallcl
and govcl and its IV version. The coeﬃcient on the consolidated variable, lsgecl,
is positive and remains so in the IV version. In fact, the IV version displays an even
larger coeﬃcient, which we ascribe to the attenuation eﬀects of measurement error in
the non-instrumented estimation.29
[Table 9 here]
29We have also run instrumented and non-instrumented probit regressions using a subsample of
274.8 The Eﬀect of Enforcement
The previous results show evidence of correlation in the degree of informality across
stages of production. Our second model suggests that increased tolerance towards
informality in the upstream sector leads to a reduction in formalization in the down-
stream sector. Similarly, higher tolerance for informality among downstream ﬁrms is
accompanied by higher degree of tax avoidance in the upstream sector. We use the
measures of formalization enforcement in the labor market described in subsection 4.2
as an indicator for monitoring within each state-economic sector from which a ﬁrm
buys (using the technical coeﬃcients as weights) and to which a ﬁrm sells (using the
output allocations as weights). Our estimates on Table 10 show that enforcement in
upstream or downstream sectors has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of formalization.
[Table 10 here]
4.9 SIMPLES: S˜ ao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul
In 1996 the Brazilian federal government established the SIMPLES tax program.
The program was targeted at small ﬁrms: those with roughly less than R$1,000,000
in annual revenues. It consolidated taxes and social security contributions in a single
payment and aimed at simplifying the veriﬁcation and remittance procedures for tax
collection. Although states and municipalities were allowed to join the system for the
collection of value added taxes (ICMS and ISS), very few did. More than 20 states
eventually established instead their own state-level versions of the SIMPLES system
for the collection of VAT and other state taxes. In 1998, the state of S˜ ao Paulo
established a local version of the SIMPLES program. The system exempted ﬁrms
with less than R$ 120,000 annual revenues from the collection of the state VAT and
oﬀered reduced rates to larger ﬁrms with at most R$1.2 million in annual revenues.
The program provided ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant reduction in VAT. For example, a ﬁrm
selling R$60,000 in a month with input costs at R$20,000 would pay R$7,200 in VAT
before the SIMPLES. Under the new program, the VAT would amount to less than
R$1,300.
We use the ﬁrst round of the ECINF survey, collected in 1997, and its 2003
edition to measure the eﬀect of this reduction in VAT on formalization in the state of
ﬁrms having only large and small ﬁrm clients and using the latter as baseline. The coeﬃcient for
the large client dummy is also positive in the non-instrumented version of this estimation and it also
increases when we use the instrumental variables.
28S˜ ao Paulo. For comparison we use the state of Rio Grande do Sul, which established
its state SIMPLES only by the end of 2005. Table 11 displays summary statistics on
some key variables in 1997 for these two states. With the exception of the number of
workers, the proportion of registered ﬁrms and whether the entrepreneur holds other
jobs, the means for the variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 10% level.
[Table 11 here]
Table 12 displays results from a probit model where dummy variables for the
state and pre- and post-introduction of the state SIMPLES are used to assess the
variation in the formalization in S˜ ao Paulo. We apply the controls we used in the
previous formalization regressions.30 The results point to a positive impact of the pro-
gram introduction with a marginal eﬀect of 5.48 percentage points on formalization,
increasing the probability of formalization by approximately one-third.
[Table 12 here]
4.10 Robustness: Tax Substitution
Brazilian tax law imposes forward tax substitution (“substitui¸ c˜ ao tribut´ aria para
frente”) in certain sectors.31 Under this tax collection system, the value added tax is
charged at the initial stage in the production chain at a rate estimated by the State.
This method tends to be adopted for activities with a reduced set of initial producers
and many smaller units at the subsequent stages of production. Since no extra value
added tax is imposed one should not expect a chain eﬀect within these sectors.
We ran probit estimates on activities where tax substitution is imposed. These
activities (and their CNAE numerical activity designation) are automobile and auto-
parts manufacturing (34001, 34002, 35010, 35020, 35030, 35090), production of tires
(25010), production and distribution of liquor (15050 and 53030), cigarettes (16000),
commercialization of automobiles and tires (50010, 50020, 50030 and 54040), distri-
bution of fuel (50050 and 53065), bars and similar establishments (55030) and oil
reﬁning (23010 and 23020).
The results concerning investment and installations, number of employees,
and the entrepreneur’s education level remain qualitatively as before. In Table 13 we
interact tax-substitution with our measure of formality of the clients. To facilitate
30Standard errors are not clustered by urban sector since their deﬁnition varied between 1997 and
2003.
31Tax substitution is not peculiar to Brazil. See [18].
29comparisons with the results in Table 9 we again consolidate the dummy variables
indicating large ﬁrms, small ﬁrms and governmental institutions as a single variable.
The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is negative and signiﬁcant and the p-value of the
hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients of this interaction term and the coeﬃcient
on the aggregate measure of client formalization equals zero is .0636. Hence we fail to
reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that in the sectors with tax substitution there
is no chain eﬀect.
Our model predict this decrease in the interaction eﬀect but does not make
any prediction concerning the eﬀect on the level of informality. The tax authorities
in Brazil impose tax substitution hoping to increase compliance. The ﬁrms in our
sample that belong to the tax substitution sectors tend to have more individuals
(as opposed to ﬁrms or government) as clients and to be owned by less educated
entrepreneurs, both factors associated with less formality. Nonetheless they tend to
be more formal than ﬁrms in the remaining sectors. In fact the diﬀerence in the rate
of formalization between ﬁrms in the tax substitution sectors and the other ﬁrms is
7.8 percentage points (with a standard error of .4), a very large eﬀect when compared
with the average level of 13.2% in our sample. This probably reﬂects the criterium
used by the Brazilian tax authorities. Tax substitution is impose when at some level
in the chain the typical producer is a large ﬁrm. If these large ﬁrms cannot aﬀord
to become informal it is likely that, through the chain eﬀect, the smaller ﬁrms which
are suppliers and buyers will tend to become formal.
[Table 13 here]
5 Conclusion
We presented two models of informality. An implications of the ﬁrst model is that in-
formal ﬁrms are smaller, less productive and with less capital per worker. The second
model predicts that informality may be transmitted through vertical relationships
when value added taxes are levied through the credit method. Using microdata from
surveys conducted in Brazil, we conﬁrmed implications of both models.
30Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is by induction on the cardinality of supp(x), which is countable since x is
assumed discrete. The notation supp denotes the support of a given random variable.
For a set A, #A is the cardinality of that set. Recall that we assume that  ∼ G(·)
is independent of x and supp() = R.
Step 1: (#supp(x) = 1) In this case, lnx is a constant and we can focus on:
E
BLP[lnl|lnx,1xe≥θ.lnx;xe
 ≥ ˆ θ] = ϕ0 + ϕ11xe≥θ
where ϕ0 = ξ0 + ξ1 lnx (so that ξ0 and ξ1 are not separately identiﬁable) and ϕ1 =
ξ2 lnx. We will show that ϕ1 > 0 and this in turn implies that sgn(ξ2) = sgn(lnx).
This being a best linear projection,
ϕ1 =
cov(lnl(xe),1xe≥θ|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
var(1xe≥θ|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
⇒ sgn(ϕ1) = sgn(cov(lnl(xe
),1xe≥θ|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ))
where we stress the point that the equilibrium demand for labor l(xe) is a function
of x and . Let  solve
xe
 = θ ⇔  = lnθ − lnx
and ˆ  solve
xe
ˆ  = ˆ θ ⇔ ˆ  = ln ˆ θ − lnx
The covariance can then be written as
cov(lnl,1xe≥θ|xe









)dG(| ≥ ˆ ).
Z
≥ˆ 









)dG(| ≥ ˆ ).
1 − G()
1 − G(ˆ )
=
G() − G(ˆ )









)dG(| ≥ ˆ ).
1 − G()
1 − G(ˆ )




lnβ + lnθ +
1
1 − α − β
ln(1 − τ) +
α
1 − α − β
lnα −
α
1 − α − β
lnr −
1 − α
1 − α − β
w.
31where τ = 0 and r = ri if the entrepreneur is informal and τ > 0 and r = rf otherwise.
Remember that
l(θ,rf,τ) > l
where l(θ,rf,τ) is the optimal labor demand of a formal ﬁrm with skill parameter θ
and l is the labor demand for an informal ﬁrm with skill parameter l constrained to
employ at most k = k. This information is important because
xe




 < θ(⇔  < ) ⇒ lnl(xe
) < lnl.
So the covariance should be
cov(lnl,1xe≥θ|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ) =
G() − G(ˆ )









)dG(| ≥ ˆ ).
1 − G()
1 − G(ˆ )
>
(G() − G(ˆ ))(1 − G())
(1 − G(ˆ ))
2 (lnl(θ,rf,τ) − lnl)
≥ 0
Step 2: (#supp(x) = n) Assume that supp(lnx) ⊂ R+ and that the assertion in the
proposition is valid for #supp(x) = n − 1.
Consider the following best linear projections:
lnl = α0 + α1 lnx + η
and
1xe≥θ.lnx = β0 + β1 lnx + ν.
These being best linear projections,
η = lnl − E(lnl|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ) − α1[lnx − E(lnx|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ)]
and
ν = 1xe≥θ.lnx − E(1xe≥θ.lnx|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ) − β1[lnx − E(lnx|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ)]
where
α1 =
cov(lnl,lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
var(lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
and β1 =
cov(1xe≥θ.lnx,lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
var(lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
.
32The Frisch-Waugh-Lowell Theorem then allows us to state that
ξ2 =
cov(η,ν|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
var(ν|xe ≥ ˆ θ)
.
The covariance in the numerator will determine the sign of ξ2. This can be seen to
be:
cov(lnl,1xe≥θ|xe ≥ ˆ θ).lnx − β1cov(lnl,lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ) =
cov(lnl,(1xe≥θ − β1).lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ).
Let x = maxsupp(x) and K = supp(x) − {x}. We can view x as a mixture
of two distributions: with probability P(x = x) we sample from a distribution that
delivers x with certainty and with complementary probability we sample from the
distribution of x conditional on the event {x ∈ K}. The ﬁrst one has a support of
size one and the second, a support of size n − 1.
An analysis of variance argument yields
cov(lnl,1xe≥θ lnx|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ) = E{cov(lnl,1xe≥θ lnx|1K;xe
 ≥ ˆ θ)|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ} +
cov(E(lnl|1K),E(1xe≥θ lnx|1K;xe
 ≥ ˆ θ)|xe
 ≥ ˆ θ)
where 1K = 1 if the sample is taken from K and = 0, otherwise.
When 1K = 1, the conditional covariance cov(lnl,1xe≥θ lnx|1K = 1|xe ≥ ˆ θ) > 0 be-
cause lnx > 0 and #K = n−1. Alternatively, for 1K = 0 the conditional covariance
cov(lnl,1xe≥θ lnx|1K = 0;xe ≥ ˆ θ) = cov(lnl,1xe≥θ lnx|xe ≥ ˆ θ) can be seen to be
positive using an argument akin to the one on Step 1 and the fact that lnx > 0. The
expectation of these conditional covariances is hence positive.
Notice as well that the E(lnl|1K = 0;xe ≥ ˆ θ) > E(lnl|1K = 1;xe ≥ ˆ θ) and
E(1xe≥θ lnx|1K = 0;xe ≥ ˆ θ) > E(1xe≥θ lnx|1K = 1;xe ≥ ˆ θ) since x > x,∀x ∈ K
and both lnl and 1xe≥θ lnx are increasing in x for every given . Consequently, the
covariance of the conditional expectations is positive. By induction, the result holds.

33Appendix B: Non Degenerate Probability of Detec-
tion
We restrict ourselves to only one input: labor. In this model agents possess a degree of
entrepreneurial ability quantiﬁed by the parameter θ, which is distributed according
to a density function g. With an amount l of labor an entrepreneur can produce θlβ
units of output, paying a wage w for the labor input which is then taxed at a rate
λ−1 (if formally established). In case the entrepreneur chooses to be informal, he or
she does not pay the tax but may be caught with a probability p(l), which we assume
to be a non-decreasing function of the number of employees a ﬁrm has. Once this
happens, proﬁts are ceased by the authorities and set to zero. A person can choose
to be an entrepreneur in the formal or informal sectors or a worker.
The proﬁt functions for formal and informal entrepreneurs are then given by:
Πi(l) = (1 − p(l)) × (θl
β − wl) and Πf(l) = θl
β − λwl
respectively.
Before proceeding we examine some conditions under which the maximization
problem is concave. For the formal entrepreneur, β < 1 is suﬃcient. With respect to






β − wl) + (1 − p(l)) × (θβl
β−1 − w).
Diﬀerentiating this expression, we achieve
d2Πi
dl2 (l) = −p
00(l) × (θl
β − wl) − 2p
0(l) × (θβl
β−1 − w) + (1 − p(l))θβ(β − 1)l
β−2.
For the sake of illustration, take p(l) = 1−(1+l)−γ. The parameter γ controls
how fast the probability of capture goes to one as the number of employees increases
as shown in Figure 2.
In a critical point,
dΠi
dl
(l) = −γ(1 + l)
−1 × (θl
β − wl) + (θβl
β−1 − w) = 0.
The curvature of the function at this point is then given by
d2Πi
dl2 (l) = γ(γ + 1)(1 + l)
−γ−2(θl
β − wl) − 2γ(1 + l)
−γ−1(θβl




34which we want to be negative. Using the expression for the ﬁrst derivative and
simplifying terms, this requires that
(1 − γ)(1 + l)
−1(θβl
β−1 − w) + θβ(β − 1)l
β−2 ≤ 0.
Noticing that the second term is negative and θβlβ−1 − w, non-negative (from the
ﬁrst-derivative expression), a suﬃcient condition is that
γ ≥ 1.
If, on the other hand, γ ≤ 1, we may rewrite this expression as
(1 − γ)(1 + l)
−1(θβl
β−1 − w) + θβ(β − 1)l
β−2 ≤
θβ[(β − γ)l + (β − 1)]
l2−β
and the term in the right is negative if γ ≤ β. So, a suﬃcient condition for the
program to be concave is that γ ≤ β. In other words, the probability of being
caught rises fast enough with the employment size. This is by no means necessary, as
γ = 0 would still constitute a concave problem though. Examining the expressions
above, one can see that, for reasonably small θs and/or large w the problem remains
concave. Figure 3 depicts the proﬁt function for diﬀerent levels of γ and a speciﬁc set
of parameters.
With a low enough probability of being caught it is intuitive that it pays for an
entrepreneur to become and informal manager. In order to make it disadvantageous
for higher ability entrepreneurs to become informal, the monitoring technology has
to become informative suﬃciently fast as employment rises.







1/(1−β) > (1 − p(l)) × (θl
β − wl), ∀l
Here, the left hand side expression is the optimal proﬁt in the formal sector for the
individual with ability θ. If we use 1 − p(l) = (1 + l)−γ, one observes that the above
condition is easier to satisfy as γ increases. So, the faster the monitoring system
improves with the number of employees, the more it favors formality.
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37Table 1: Variable Description
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
taxreg 1 = Tax Registration 48695 0.132 0.339
taxsub 1 = Tax Substitution 48701 0.178 0.383
largecl 1 = Large Client 48693 0.041 0.198
smallcl 1 = Small Client 48693 0.070 0.255
govcl 1 = Government Client 48693 0.008 0.089
outsidehouse 1 = Outside Household 48697 0.640 0.480
n worker Number of Employees 48701 1.477 1.051
revenue Revenue in Oct/2003 (R$ 1,000) 47942 2.115 6.487
otherjob 1 = Owner has Other Job 48675 0.125 0.331
bankloan 1 = Bank Loan 48678 0.063 0.242
education Education Level (Owner) 48639 4.380 1.890
age Age (Owner) 48701 41.034 12.309
gender Gender (Owner) 48699 0.645 0.478
ho num Homeowner × Number of Rooms 48419 4.901 3.329
loginst Log of Installations (R$) 40135 5.839 1.768
loginv Log of Investments (R$) 8210 6.523 2.165
proﬁt Proﬁt in Oct/2003 (R$ 1,000) 45058 0.778 4.713
sup enf Supplier Enforcement 48229 0.012 0.010
cl enf Client Enforcement 48229 0.010 0.010
logwage Log of Mean Wage (R$ 1,000) 6584 -1.824 0.857
supplierformal Formalization among Suppliers 48131 0.160 0.035
clientformal Formalization among Clients 48229 0.128 0.039Table 2: Education
1 = No education
2 = Reads and writes
3 = Some primary education
4 = Graduated primary school
5 = Some secondary education
6 = Graduated secondary school
7 = Some College education
8 = Graduated CollegeTable 3: Correlation Matrix
taxreg taxsub largecl smallcl govcl outsdhous n empl rev otherjob
taxsub 0.09 1.00
largecl 0.13 -0.07 1.00
smallcl 0.08 -0.07 -0.06 1.00
govcl 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
outsidehouse 0.09 -0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 1.00
n worker 0.47 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.10 1.00
revenue 0.36 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.41 1.00
otherjob -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 1.00
bankloan 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.01
education 0.27 -0.12 0.10 0.11 0.07 -0.03 0.20 0.19 0.14
age 0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.04
gender 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.06 -0.05
ho num 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.13 0.11 0.05
loginst 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.50 0.47 -0.04
loginv 0.43 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.40 0.32 -0.01
proﬁt 0.12 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.48 0.00
sup enf -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
cl enf 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01
logwage 0.30 -0.08 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.29 -0.05
clform 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.13 -0.01
supform 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.00Correlation Matrix (cont’d)
bankloan educ age gender ho num loginst loginv proﬁt sup enf logwage
education 0.08 1.00
age 0.00 -0.18 1.00
gender -0.01 -0.12 0.03 1.00
ho num 0.03 0.18 0.17 -0.03 1.00
loginst 0.20 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.15 1.00
loginv 0.22 0.38 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.64 1.00
proﬁt 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.11 1.00
sup enf 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.03 1.00
cl enf 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.72 1.00
logwage 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.54 0.37 0.06 -0.11 -0.01
clform 0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.05 0.28 0.28 0.04 0.12 0.42





Table 4: Economic Sector
Freq. % Description
1 5,639 10.96 Transformation and Mineral Extraction Industry
2 7,246 14.08 Construction
3 14,835 28.83 Retail and Repair Services
4 4,679 9.09 Lodging and Food Services
5 4,636 9.01 Transportation and Communications
6 3,634 7.06 Real Estate and Services
7 3,453 6.71 Education, Health and Social Services
8 5,096 9.9 Other Collective, Social and Personal Services
9 2,246 4.36 Other ActivitiesTable 5: Probit Estimates
Dep. Var. = Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ. Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ.
taxreg (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
outsidehouse 0.168∗∗ 0.021 0.171∗∗ 0.022
(0.023) (0.024)
n worker 0.406∗∗ 0.053 0.418∗∗ 0.051
(0.012) (0.012)
revenue 0.051∗∗ 0.007 0.045∗∗ 0.005
(0.005) (0.004)
bankloan 0.388∗∗ 0.065 0.357∗∗ 0.055
(0.033) (0.034)
otherjob -0.238∗∗ -0.027 -0.270∗∗ -0.028
(0.033) (0.033)
education 0.195∗∗ 0.0254 0.178∗∗ 0.022
(0.006) (0.006)
age 0.035∗∗ 0.005 0.040∗∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.005)
age2 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
gender 0.153∗∗ 0.019 0.216∗∗ 0.025
(0.020) (0.021)
ho num 0.029∗∗ 0.004 0.028∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Sector Dummies Yes No
Output Coeﬀ. No Yes





1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by urban sector.Table 6: Investment, Installations and Proﬁts
Dep. Var. = loginvperworker loginstperworker proﬁt
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
taxreg 0.636∗∗ 0.812∗∗ 0.672∗∗
(0.061) (0.031) (0.149)
outsidehouse 0.202∗∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.045) (0.017) (0.061)
bankloan 0.737∗∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.031
(0.059) (0.026) (0.126)
otherjob -0.264∗∗ -0.256∗∗ -0.182†
(0.057) (0.022) (0.098)
education 0.243∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.181∗∗
(0.013) (0.005) (0.016)
age 0.032∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.010) (0.003) (0.012)
age2 0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gender 0.516∗∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.253∗∗
(0.044) (0.015) (0.046)






N 8041 39480 44714
R2 0.332 0.357 0.036
F (44,·) 69.675 304.781 20.801
1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. The regressions also control for state and sector.
3. Standard errors are clustered by urban sector.Table 7: Log of Number of Workers (= Dep. Var.)
Dep.Var. = Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
education 0.006∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)




















Sector Dummies Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes
N 47567 6425
R2 0.3 0.196
F (·,·) 165.441 22.857
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%Table 8: Probit Estimates (Chain Eﬀects)
Dep. Var. = Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ. Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ. Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ.











outsidehouse 0.175∗∗ 0.022 0.163∗∗ 0.021 0.161∗∗ 0.02
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
n worker 0.406∗∗ 0.053 0.406∗∗ 0.053 0.420∗∗ 0.053
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
revenue 0.049∗∗ 0.001 0.051∗∗ 0.007 0.046∗∗ 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
bankloan 0.386∗∗ 0.007 0.391∗∗ 0.065 0.371∗∗ 0.06
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
otherjob -0.227∗∗ 0.003 -0.233∗∗ -0.027 -0.230∗∗ -0.026
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
education 0.187∗∗ 0.001 0.187∗∗ 0.024 0.186∗∗ 0.024
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
age 0.035∗∗ 0.001 0.035∗∗ 0.005 0.036∗∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age2 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gender 0.126∗∗ 0.002 0.118∗∗ 0.015 0.138∗∗ 0.017
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ho num 0.029∗∗ 0.000 0.029∗∗ 0.000 0.029∗∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 47562 47015 47111
Pseudo-R2 0.3688 0.3669 0.3733
χ2
· 5616.836 5552.863 5689.707
1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by urban sector.
3. The regressions also control for state and sector.Table 9: IV Probit Estimates (Chain Eﬀects)
Non-IV IV
Dep. Var. = Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ.





















ho num 0.030∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
N 47,562 47,562
1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. The regressions also control for state and sector.
3. The second regression uses the average level of education
in the urban sector as an instrument.
4. Standard errors clustered by urban sector.Table 10: Probit Estimates (Enforcement)
Dep. Var. = Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ. Coeﬀ. Marg. Eﬀ.
taxreg (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
sup enf 5.702∗∗ 0.751
(1.448)
cl enf 11.952∗∗ 1.558
(1.263)
outsidehouse 0.171∗∗ 0.022 0.171∗∗ 0.022
(0.023) (0.023)
n worker 0.406∗∗ 0.053 0.411∗∗ 0.054
(0.012) (0.012)
revenue 0.051∗∗ 0.001 0.049∗∗ 0.006
(0.005) (0.004)
bankloan 0.386∗∗ 0.065 0.382∗∗ 0.063
(0.033) (0.033)
otherjob -0.238∗∗ -0.028 -0.234∗∗ -0.027
(0.033) (0.033)
education 0.195∗∗ 0.026 0.189∗∗ 0.025
(0.006) (0.006)
age 0.034∗∗ 0.005 0.034∗∗ 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
age2 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
gender 0.156∗∗ 0.02 0.145∗∗ 0.018
(0.020) (0.020)






1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by urban sector.
3. The regressions also control for state and sector.Table 11: S˜ ao Paulo (SP) × Rio Grande do Sul (RS) (1997)
SP RS
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
outsidehouse 2749 0.66 2064 0.67
n worker∗∗ 2750 1.53 1.16 2065 1.61 1.18
revenue 2679 3.11 9.17 2041 2.94 6.88
bankloan 2745 0.07 2062 0.06
taxreg∗∗ 2748 0.20 2065 0.27
otherjob∗∗ 2746 0.10 2064 0.13
education 2744 4.95 1.93 2063 4.85 1.90
age 2750 43.12 12.60 2065 42.90 12.34
gender 2750 0.64 2065 0.65
∗∗ : Diﬀerence in means is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 12: Probit Estimates (SIMPLES)
Dep. Var. = Coeﬃcient Marg. Eﬀ.
taxreg (Std. Err.)










1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. Controls include outsidehouse, n employee, revenue,
bankloan, otherjob, education, age, age2, gender,

































1. Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by urban sector.
3. The regressions also control for state and sector.Figure 1: Comparative StaticsFigure 2: Probability of Being CaughtFigure 3: Proﬁt Function for Informal Entrepreneur